Vulnerability Assessment of Power Grids Based on Both Topological and
  Electrical Properties by Pu, Cunlai & Wu, Pang
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
05
78
9v
1 
 [e
es
s.S
Y]
  3
 Se
p 2
01
9
1
Vulnerability Assessment of Power Grids Based on
Both Topological and Electrical Properties
Cunlai Pu and Pang Wu
Abstract—In modern power grids, a local failure or attack
can trigger catastrophic cascading failures, which make it chal-
lenging to assess the attack vulnerability of power grids. In
this Brief, we define the K-link attack problem and study the
attack vulnerability of power grids under cascading failures.
Particularly, we propose a link centrality measure based on both
topological and electrical properties of power grids. According
to this centrality, we propose a greedy attack algorithm and
an optimal attack algorithm. Simulation results on standard
IEEE bus test data show that the optimal attack is better
than the greedy attack and the traditional PSO-based attack in
fracturing power grids. Moreover, the greedy attack has smaller
computational complexity than the optimal attack and the PSO-
based attack with an adequate attack efficiency. Our work helps
to understand the vulnerability of power grids and provides some
clues for securing power grids.
Index Terms—Vulnerability assessment, power grid, link cen-
trality, cascading failure, network attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, power grids in the real world face various
kinds of risks such as natural disasters and attacks. Even
worse, a local failure in power grids can result in large-
scale blackouts [1], [2]. A recent example is the nationwide
recurring electrical blackouts in Venezuela began in March
2019, which was supposed to be caused by a local vegetation
fire and cyberattacks. The catastrophic cascades of failures
pose a great threat to human life and national security. Thus, it
is of great importance to understand and control the cascading
failures of power grids.
In the past decade, the complex network theory has been
widely applied to the study of cascading failures [3]. On
the modelling side, power grids can be abstracted as inter-
dependent networks, and then the percolation theory has been
used to explore the dynamics of cascading failures [4]. Rich
behaviors have been observed when taking the power grid as
interdependent network. For instance, Buldyrev et al. [5] found
a hybrid phase transition (HPT), where the order parameter has
both a jump and a critical scaling.
On the controlling side, researchers proposed many opti-
mization strategies against cascading failures in power grids.
Tu et al. [6] used the simulated annealing method to optimize
the network topology, and found that it is better to make
the network sparsely connected, and place the generators
as decentralized hubs. They further investigated the weak
interdependency between networks of cyber-physical systems
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(CPS) and discussed how the failure propagation probabilities
affect the robustness of CPS [7]. Chen et al. [8] performed
the critical node analysis to identify the vital nodes in terms
of network robustness. They found that assortative coupling
of node destructiveness is more robust in densely coupled net-
works, whereas disassortative coupling of node robustness and
node destructiveness is better in sparsely coupled networks.
Zhong et al. [9] studied the repair process against cascading
failures by considering the optimization of repair resource,
timing and load tolerance, for different coupling strength and
network topologies of interdependent networks. Zhu et al.
[10] established two multiobjective optimization models that
consider both the operational cost of links and the robustness
of networks. Zhang et al. [11] employed the particle swarm
optimization (PSO) algorithm to optimize the defense resource
allocation to improve the network robustness.
To better understand and control cascading failures, we need
to explore the role of individual nodes and links in power
grids. When quantifying the importance of nodes or links, the
complex network theory only focuses on network topology
information [3], [12], [13]. However, the electrical features
of nodes and links are profound [14]. Particularly, a link of
small topological importance might have large current load.
The broken of this kind of link has significant impact on the
function of power grids. It is thus more reasonable to consider
both topological and electrical features of power grids when
characterizing the importance of nodes and links.
In this brief, we study vulnerability assessment of power
grids under cascading failures. We define the importance of
links based on both topological and electrical features, and
remove a few important links as the initial attack that triggers
cascading failures. Our main contributions are as follows:
• We propose a link centrality measure, which combines
link degree and link current. The weights of the two
features are tunable and represented by two variables.
This centrality is better than link degree and link current
in quantifying the importance of links in power grids.
• According to the link centrality, we propose a greedy
attack algorithm and an optimal attack algorithm. These
attack algorithms are designed to cause large-scale cas-
cading failures, based on which we can assess the vul-
nerability of power grids by simulation.
In the next section, we present the cascading failure model
and related metrics. In section III, we introduce our link
centrality measure and the parameter tuning method. In section
IV, we define the link attack problem and provide our attack
2related analysis. Section VI is our conclusion.
II. MODEL AND MEASUREMENT
In a power grid, power stations and transmission lines can
be abstracted as nodes and links, respectively. Then, we obtain
the network topology of power grid, denoted by G = (V,E),
where V is the node set with N nodes, and E is the link set
consisting of M links.
A. Current model
Usually, there are generator node, consumer node, distri-
bution node, and transformer node in a power grid. Here,
following Ref. [6] and for the purpose of simplification,
we only consider two kinds of nodes: generator node i and
consumer node j. Then, the Kirchhoff’s current law equation
for a power grid is written as
Y ∗ [· · · vi v j · · · ] = [· · · vi I j · · · ], (1)
in which
Y =


. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . yi 0 . . .
. . . −Yji Yj j . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .

 , (2)
and vi and v j represent the voltages of generator node and
consumer node, respectively. I j is the current of consumer
node j. In matrix Y , yi = 1. Yi j is the admittance of link (i, j),
and Yi j = 0 if nodes i and j are not connected. Also, we have
Yj j= −∑i6= jYji. When the admittances of transmission lines,
the voltages of generator nodes and the current consumptions
of consumer nodes are given, the voltage of each node can be
computed by Eq. (1). Then, the current flowing through link
(i, j) can be calculated as Ii j = (vi− v j)∗Yi j.
B. Cascading failure model
Assume the load of node i is L(i) = ui ∗ Ioi, where Ioi is the
total current flowing out of node i, and the load of link (i, j)
is the current flowing through it, i.e., Ii j. The maximum load
a node can bear is set to be 1+α times of its original load,
and the maximum load of link (i, j) is assumed to be 1+β
times of its original current, where parameters α and β are the
safety margins of nodes and links, respectively. Note that the
original state of nodes or links corresponds to the case when
the power grid operates normally, that is there is no attacks
or failures. In the cascading failure model [5], there is usually
an initial attack, e.g. randomly removing a node or link. This
initial event will cause the load change of the other nodes and
links, especially for those close to the area of initial attack.
When the load of a node or link exceeds its maximum allowed
value, it will break, which further causes the load change of
the other nodes and links. The detailed steps in the cascading
failure simulation process are as follows [6]:
i) Calculating the initial load and maximum load of each
component (node and link) in the power grid.
ii) Randomly removing a component.
iii) The grid topology changes due to the removal, recalcu-
lating the load of each component. A component is set to be
broken if its load exceeds its maximum.
iv) After removing the failed components, the network splits
into several small subgraphs. If a subgraph does not contain a
generator node, all nodes in this subgraph are set to be invalid
nodes.
v) Repeating steps iii) -iv) until the load of all remaining
components is no greater than the maximum.
C. Vulnerability measurement
In power systems, the outage scale is usually measured by
the number of failed nodes. Following Ref. [6], the damage
that is caused by component set i is quantified as
Φ(i) =
Nunserved(i)
N
, (3)
where Nunserved(i) is the number of total failed nodes after the
cascading failure caused by the initial removal of component
set i. Note that the failed nodes contain the overloaded ones
and those in the subnetwork of no generator nodes. Obviously,
the larger the damage, the more critical the component set is
to the power grid.
III. LINK CENTRALITY MEASURE AND ITS SOLUTION
Nodes and links are the main components in power grids.
Node centrality has been widely discussed in the literature.
Here we study the link centrality which is relatively less
discussed, but critical to the vulnerability assessment of power
grids. Previously, many topology based link centralities were
developed [3]. However, the joint effect of topological and
electrical properties of links on the vulnerability of power girds
is still not well understood.
A. Our link centrality measure
We quantify the centrality of links based on both topological
and electrical features. Specifically, we consider the link
degree and link current. The degree of a link is the number
of links (except itself) incident to its two end nodes. The
current of a link is the rate of flow of electric charge pasting
it. Note that during the cascading failure, the degree and
current of a link might change due to the broken of overloaded
components. Since we focus on the initial attacks, we use the
original state of power grid to quantify the centrality of links.
Then, the centrality of link (i, j) is defined as
Θi j = h1Di j+ h2Ii j, (4)
where Di j and Ii j are the initial degree and current of link
(i, j), respectively. For link current, we ignore its direction and
use its absolute value. h1 and h2, ranging in (−∞,∞), are the
weights of link degree and link current. In real applications,
we usually need to find the optimal values of h1 and h2, which
is a NP-hard problem.
B. Parameter tuning based on PSO
We use the particle swarm optimization algorithm (PSO)
[15], to search the optimal parameters of our link centrality
measure. Compared with other heuristic algorithms, PSO has
powerful global search ability and is easy to implement. In this
3algorithm, there are m(> 0) particles moving on the network.
Particle i is a candidate solution of parameters, Xi = [h1,h2],
and corresponds to a local optimal value pibest . For all the
particles, there is a global optimal value gbest = max{p
i
best}.
The particle position is continuously updated according to the
following equations:
vi
k+1 = wvi
k+ c1r1(p
i
best − xi
k)+ c2r2(gbest − xi
k) (5)
xi
k+1 = xi
k+ vi
k (6)
w= w0− iter/itermax (7)
In Eq. (5), r1 and r2 are random numbers in [0,1]. c1 is the
cognitive coefficient and c2 is the social learning coefficient.
In Eq. (6), vi
k and xi
k are the velocity and position of the
ith particle in the kth iteration. In Eq. (7), w is the inertia
coefficient. Large inertia coefficient helps particles jump out of
the local optimum, while small inertia coefficient is beneficial
to the local accurate search and convergence of the algorithm.
w0 is the initial inertia coefficient. iter and itermax respectively
represent the current number of iterations and the maximum
allowed number of iterations.
IV. APPLICATION OF LINK CENTRALITY IN
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
We apply our link centrality to the vulnerability assessment
of power grids. In the assessment, we usually simulate net-
work attacks and the consequent cascading failures, and then
calculate the damage caused by the attacks. Different kinds of
attacks result in different damage. Here, we consider the link
attacks. The simplest link attack strategy is random attack, in
which we randomly remove a certain fraction of links. More
efficient link attack strategies are desired in the vulnerability
assessment.
A. Problem Definition
Given an integer K, the problem is to find a set of K links
(1≤ K ≤M), the removal of which will cause the maximum
damage to the power grid (abbreviated as KLS problem). Note
that the damage is measured as the percentage of failed nodes
after the cascading failure (see Eq. (3)), which is triggered by
the initial removal of the K-link set.
Theorem 1. The KLS problem is NP-Complete.
Proof. Given a set of K links, we can calculate the percentage
of failed nodes after the cascading failure triggered by the
removal of the set of links in polynomial time, which means
that the KLS problem is NP. Moreover, the KLS problem can
be reduced to the 0/1 knapsack problem [16]. In this problem,
given a set of items, each with a weight and a value, we
determine the number of each item, 0 or 1, to include in a
collection so that the total weight is less than or equal to a
given limit and the total value is as large as possible. In the
KLS problem, each link can cause some damage, and can be
selected or not. The number of selected links is fixed to be
K. The task is to determine the K-link set that achieves the
largest damage. Since 0/1 knapsack problem is NP-Complete,
so is the KLS problem. 
B. Optimal attack based on PSO
Since the KLS problem can be reduced to the 0/1 knapsack
problem and is NP-Complete, we employ the PSO to search
the optimal K-link set. In the m particles, particle i is set to be
Xi = [x1,x2, . . . ,xM], where x j corresponds to the jth link of
the power grid. If this link is selected to be removal, x j = 1;
otherwise, x j = 0. The constraint is ∑
M
j=1 x j =K. The particles
update their velocity and position iteratively based on Eqs. (5)-
(7) until finding the approximately optimal solution of the KLS
problem. Since the duration of single cascade failure is unable
to estimate, we only consider the number of cascading failures
when discussing the time complexity. The PSO based optimal
attack (PSO-OA) has the time complexity of O(m ∗ itermax).
The pseudocode of this algorithm is in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 PSO based optimal attack (PSO-OA)
Require: Adjacency matrix G, power generator node set Q,
and integer K
Ensure: The total number of selected links is fixed to be K.
Initialisation: Randomly generate m particles; each particle
contains M elements; randomly set K elements to be 1 and
the rest to 0.
for i= 1,itermax do
for j = 1,m do
Calculate Φ(X j) for each particle
end for
Update the optimal solution for each particle pibest and
the global optimal solution for the particle swarms gbest
for s= 1,m do
if Φ(Xs) > Φ(p
s
best) then
Φ(psbest), p
s
best ← Φ(Xs), Xs
end if
if Φ(Xs) > Φ(gbest) then
Φ(gbest), gbest ← Φ(Xs), Xs
end if
if Φ(Xs) = gbest then
Re-initialize the particle
end if
end for
Update speed v and position x
Select the top K positions of each particle based on the
ranking of their current value and reset them to 1; the other
positions are reset to 0.
end for
return the K links of the largest damage
C. Greedy attack based on link centrality
In a simple greedy attack, we can calculate the damage of
each link based on Eq. (3) and then select the K links of the
largest damage. However, it is time consuming to calculate
the damage of all links. Therefore, we use our link centrality
measurement to filter the links so that the relatively important
links are left for consideration. Specifically, we rank all of the
links based on their link centrality values. Then, we calculate
the damage of the top L (ML% ≥ K) percent of links in the
ranking, and select the K links of the largest damage.
4Note that the parameters of our link centrality measure
affect the ranking of links and therefore the selection of the K-
link set. The better parameters correspond to a better ranking,
and then L can be much smaller. The time complexity of the
link centrality based greedy attack (LC-GA) is O(ML%) with-
out considering the duration of single cascading failure. Note
that we can also use PSO to search the optimal parameters in
this algorithm, but the computational cost is very large. The
pseudocode of LC-GA is given in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Link centrality based greedy attack (LC-GA)
Require: Adjacency matrix G, power generator node set Q,
and integer K
Ensure: The total number of selected links is fixed to be K.
Initialisation: Give a parameter set
Select the top L% links based on the ranking of link
centrality values
for j = 1,ML% do
Calculate the damage Φ for each selected link
end for
return the K links of the largest damage
D. Link centrality based optimal attack
The PSO-OA algorithm does not use the topological and
electrical properties of power grids. Thus, it is supposed to be
not efficient. The LC-GA algorithm does use the topological
and electrical properties, but it needs to calculate the link
centrality and the damage of many links, which has large
computational cost. Here, we employ PSO to search the
optimal parameters so that removing the top K links in the
ranking of link centrality leads to the maximum damage. The
set of the top K links is thus an approximate solution of the
KLS problem. The time complexity of this link centrality based
optimal attack (LC-OA) is O(m∗ itermax) without considering
the duration of single cascading failure. The pseudocode of
this algorithm is provided in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Link centrality based optimal attack (LC-OA)
Require: Adjacency matrix G, power generator node set Q,
and integer K
Ensure: The total number of selected links is fixed to be K.
Initialisation: Randomly generate m particles; each particle
contains 2 elements which are randomly set to values in the
range [-1,1].
for i=1, itermax do
Calculate the centrality of each link based on Eq. (4)
Calculate the damage of removing the K links of the
largest centrality
Update pbest and gbest based on the PSO algorithm
end for
return the K links of the largest centrality
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
Based on MATLAB, we do simulation experiments to vali-
date our link centrality measure and compare the performance
of proposed attack algorithms. We use the standard IEEE bus
test data [17] including IEEE 118 bus, 145 bus, and 162 bus.
We randomly set 10 percent of nodes to be generator nodes.
The related parameters of the experiments are given in Table
1.
TABLE I
Parameter settings in the experiments
m 10 c2 0.7
itermax 30 α 0.2
w0 0.96 β 0.2
c1 0.7 L 50%
A. Single link attack
IEEE 118 bus IEEE 145 bus IEEE 162 bus
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
 
 
 
 Random
 Current
 Degree
 Our centrality
Fig. 1: The results of damage Φ caused by the removal of the
most critical link associated with different centrality measures
on three IEEE bus test data.
First, we study the single link attack, K= 1, which is remov-
ing the most critical link in terms of damage. The link degree,
link currency, and our link centrality are used respectively to
determine the critical link. For our link centrality measure,
we use PSO to find the optimal solution (see LC-OA). The
results are shown in Fig. 1, which are the average of 100
independent runs. We can see that for all the three IEEE bus
test data, the random removal has the smallest damage, and
the damage of our link centrality is larger than the link degree
and link current. Moreover, link current is more efficient than
link degree, which indicates that we should focus on electrical
features more than topological features in the vulnerability
assessment of power grids.
B. Multiple link attack
Furthermore, we study the multiple link attack, k > 1, to
compare the performance of PSO-OA, LC-OA, and LC-GA.
For LC-GA, parameters h1 and h2 are both set to 1. The
results of damage are provided in Figs. 2 and 3. In Fig. 2, for
all the IEEE bus data, the damage generally increases with
the number of removed links for all the algorithms. This is
because the more links removed at the beginning result in a
wider range of cascading failure. An exception is that for LC-
GA, the damage decreases when the number of removed links
increases from 1 to 2. The reason is that LC-GA is essentially a
greedy algorithm so that its solution of K = 2 is not the optimal
one, while for K = 1, the solution could be the optimal one.
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Fig. 2: The results of damage Φ vs. number of removed links
K for the three attack algorithms on IEEE 118 bus and 162
bus data.
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Fig. 3: The results of damage Φ vs. number of iterations for
LC-OA and PSO-OA on IEEE 118 bus and 162 bus data.
Moreover, we see that the damage of LC-OA is much larger
than PSO-OA and LC-GA. In real situations, the numbers of
particles and iterations are limited, as the parameter settings
in our experiments. In this case, LC-OA can find a better
solution than PSO-OA for the multiple link attack problem.
The damage of LC-GA is smaller than LC-OA, since the
former is a greedy algorithm, while the latter is based on global
optimization essentially. Note that LC-GA is sometimes better
than PSO-OA as shown in the results of K > 6 on IEEE 162
bus data. This further validates our link centrality measure.
In Fig. 3, we see that for a given K, the damage of LC-OA
increases and converges faster than PSO-OA with the growth
of number of iterations. This further demonstrates that LC-OA
is more efficient than PSO-GA. Moreover, we see that PSO-
OA is prone to fall into the local optimum and needs many
iterations to jump out of it.
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, we study the vulnerability assessment of power
grids under cascading failures. We define the K-link attack
problem and prove that it is NP-complete. Particularly, we
propose a link centrality measure by combining the link degree
with link current. With this centrality, we develop two attack
algorithms, which are the link centrality based greedy attack
(LC-GA) and the link centrality based optimal attack (LC-
OA). We evaluate our link centrality measure and its related
attack algorithms on standard IEEE bus test data. Simulation
results show that our link centrality measure performs better
than the link degree and link current in identifying the optimal
link in the single link attack scenario. Furthermore, in the mul-
tiple link attack problem, LC-OA is much more efficient than
LC-GA and the traditional PSO based optimal attack (PSO-
OA) algorithm. LC-GA has lower computational complexity
than LC-OA and PSO-OA with a decent attack efficiency.
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